## 1

#### The role of the ballot is to answer the resolutional question- The aff’s failure to advance a topical defense of federal policy undermines debate’s potential

#### Our interpretation is grammatically correct

Ericson 3 Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or policy into action **though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### This is prior question to debate

Shively 00 Ruth Lessl, Former Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – Texas A&M, in “Political Theory and Partisan Politics”, Ed. Portis, Gundersen and Shively, pp. 181-182

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must reject and limit-some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest-that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

#### “Statutory” restrictions are binding law enacted by Congress

**Hill 13** – Gerald Hill, Juris Doctor from Hastings College of the Law of the University of California, Executive Director of the California Governor's Housing Commission, AB from Stanford University and Kathleen Hill, M.A. in Political Psychology from California State University, Sonoma, Fellow in Public Affairs at the Coro Foundation, The People's Law Dictionary, http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=2010

statute

n. a Federal or state written law **enacted by** the **Congress** or state legislature, respectively. Local statutes or laws are usually called "ordinances." **Regulations**, **rulings**, **opinions**, **executive orders** and **proclamations** are **not statutes**.

#### “Judicial” is courts --- distinct from other actors

**Webster’s 1** – Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law, “Judicial”, http://research.lawyers.com/glossary/judicial.html

Judicial

Definition - adj

[Latin judicialis, from judicium judgment, from judic- judex judge, from jus right, law + dicere to determine, say]

1 a : of or relating to a judgment, the function of judging, the administration of justice, or the judiciary

b : of, relating to, or being the branch of government that is charged with trying all cases that involve the government and with the administration of justice within its jurisdiction

compare **administrative** **executive** **legislative**

2 : created, ordered, or enforced by a court <a ~ foreclosure>

compare conventional legal

Pronunciation jü-'di-sh&l

#### Topical version of the aff---the USFG should restrict the president’s authority to indefinitely detain.

#### Voting issue for limits and ground- there are an infinite number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote aff, these obviate the only predictable strategies based on topical action- they overstretch our research burden and undermine preparedness for all debates.

#### Competitive debate is a dialogue between two teams- fairness is key to meaningful participation for both sides

Galloway 7 professor of communication at Samford University, Ryan, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

#### A limited topic of discussion is key to decision-making and advocacy skills- targets the discussion

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Discussion of policy-questions is crucial for skills development- posits students as agents of decision-making

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These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7¶ By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Switch-side debate encourages critical thinking and advocacy skills

Harrigan 8 Casey, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications – Wake Forest U., “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp.6-9

Additionally, there are social benefits to the practice of requiring students to debate both sides of controversial issues. Dating back to the Greek rhetorical tradition, great value has been placed on the benefit of testing each argument relative to all others in the marketplace of ideas. Like those who argue on behalf of the efficiency-maximizing benefits of free market competition, it is believed that arguments are most rigorously tested (and conceivably refined and improved) when compared to all available alternatives. Even for beliefs that have seemingly been ingrained in consensus opinion or in cases where the public at-large is unlikely to accept a particular position, it has been argued that they should remain open for public discussion and deliberation (Mill, 1975). Along these lines, the greatest benefit of switching sides, which goes to the heart of contemporary debate, is its inducement of critical thinking. Defined as "reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do" (Ennis, 1987, p.10), critical thinking learned through debate teaches students not just how advocate and argue, but how to decide as well. Each and every student, whether in debate or (more likely) at some later point in life, will be placed in the position of the decision-maker. Faced with competing options whose costs and benefits are initially unclear, critical thinking is necessary to assess all the possible outcomes of each choice, compare their relative merits, and arrive at some final decision about which is preferable. In some instances, such as choosing whether to eat Chinese or Indian food for dinner, the importance of making the correct decision is minor. For many other decisions, however, the implications of choosing an imprudent course of action are potentially grave. As Robert Crawford notes, there are "issues of unsurpassed important in the daily lives of millions upon millions of people...being decided to a considerable extent by the power of public speaking" (2003). Although the days of the Cold War are over, and the risk that "The next Pearl Harbor could be 'compounded by hydrogen" (Ehninger and Brockriede, 1978, p.3) is greatly reduced, the manipulation of public support before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 points to the continuing necessity of training a well-informed and critically-aware public (Zarefsky, 2007). In the absence of debate-trained critical thinking, ignorant but ambitious politicians and persuasive but nefarious leaders would be much more likely to draw the country, and possibly the world, into conflicts with incalculable losses in terms of human well-being. Given the myriad threats of global proportions that will require incisive solutions, including global warming, the spread of pandemic diseases, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cultivating a robust and effective society of critical decision-makers is essential. As Louis Rene Beres writes, "with such learning, we Americans could prepare...not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet" (2003). Thus, it is not surprising that critical thinking has been called "the highest educational goal of the activity" (Parcher, 1998). While arguing from conviction can foster limited critical thinking skills, the element of switching sides is necessary to sharpen debate's critical edge and ensure that decisions are made in a reasoned manner instead of being driven by ideology. Debaters trained in SSD are more likely to evaluate both sides of an argument before arriving at a conclusion and are less likely to dismiss potential arguments based on his or her prior beliefs (Muir 1993). In addition, debating both sides teaches "conceptual flexibility," where decision-makers are more likely to reflect upon the beliefs that are held before coming to a final opinion (Muir, 1993, p,290). Exposed to many arguments on each side of an issue, debaters learn that public policy is characterized by extraordinary complexity that requires careful consideration before action. Finally, these arguments are confirmed by preponderance of empirical research demonstrating a link between competitive SSD and critical thinking (Allen, Berkowitz, Hunt and Louden, 1999; Colbert, 2002, p.82).

#### Effective deliberation is the lynchpin of solving all existential global problems

Lundberg 10 Christian O. Lundberg Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.¶ The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:¶ To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)¶ Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.¶ There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.¶ Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

## 2

#### Use of discursive analysis is part of the culture turn – despite their attempts to incorporate materialism it remains culturalist and stuck within the paradigm of capitalism.

Ebert and Zavarzadeh 8 Teresa L., English, State University of New York, Albany, Mas’ud, prolific writer and expert on class ideology, “Class in Culture”, p. 27-29

On the theoretical level, the attacks on labor focused on the material logic: the question that Sumner H. Slichter had raised, namely that the U.S. was "shifting from a capitalistic community to a laboristic one-that is to a community in which employees rather than businessmen are the strongest single influence." This second cultural front developed new arguments for the legitimacy, permanence, and transhistorical moral and social authority of capitalism as an economic regime that was seen as the condition of possibility for human freedom. This is what, for example, F. A. Hayek's writings did. Not only did they provide the grounds for a Neoliberal economics that marginalized Keynesianism, but they also offered an ethics and a philosophy for capitalism (The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism). In a subsequent move, post-theory("post" as in postcolonialism, postrnarxism, poststructuralism, etc.) translated Neoliberal economies into a new philosophy of representation that made discourse the primary ground of social reality. Discourse was not simply a "text" in its narrow sense but the ensemble of the phenomena in and through which social production of meaning takes place, an ensemble that constitutes a society as such. The discursive isnot. therefore, being conceivedas a level nor even as a dimension of the social, but rather as being co-extensive with the social.. .. There is nothing specifically social which is constituted outside the discursive, it is clear that the non-discursive is not opposed to the discursive as if it were a matter of "'1'0 separate levels. History and society are an infinite text. (Laclau, "Populist Rupture and Discourse" 87) Class in post-theory was turned into a trope whose meanings are wayward and indeterminate-a metaphor for a particular language game(Jenks, Culture 4). This move has de-materialized class by hollowing out its economic content and turning its materialism into "a materiality without materialism and even perhaps without matter" (Derrida, "Typewriter Ribbon" 281). This de-materializing has taken place through a network of "post" interpretive strategies: Such as "destruction" (Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology 22- 23); "deconstruction" (Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese Friend"); "schizoanalysis"(Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 273-382); "reparative reading"(Sedgwick, Touching Feeling 123-151), "cultural logic"(Jameson, Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism); "performativity"(Butler, Gender Trouble); **"**immaterial labor"(Hardt and Negri, MultItude), and "whatever(qualunque)" (Agamben, The Coming Community). The goal of both the populist and the theoretical campaigns against the labor movement-which capital often referred to as "socialistic schemes" (Fones- Wolf 52}---has been the blurring of class lines by depicting class antagonisms as cultural differences**,** and to persuade people that, as Wallace F. Bennett, chairman of the National Association of Manufacturers put it, **"**We are all capitalists"(quoted in Fones-Wolf 70-73). In other words, as far as capitalism is concerned, there are no class differences in the U.S. and what makes people different are their values, lifestyles, and preferences. We call this obscuring of class relations by cultural values and the play of language the "cultural turn."The term "cultural turn" is often used to designate a 'particular movement in social and cultural inquiries that acquires analytical authority in the 1970s and is exemplified by such books as Hayden White's Metahistory and Clifford Geertz's The Interpretation of Cultures , both of which were published in 1973. White describes history writing as a poetic act and approaches it as essentially a linguistic (tropological) practice (Metahistory ix). The view of history and social practices as poiesis-which is most powerfully articulated in Heidegger's writings and is re-written in various idioms by diverse authors from Cleanth Brooks through Jacques Derrida to Giorgio Agamben-constitutes the interpretive logic of the cultural turn. Geertz's argument that culture is a semiotic practice, an ensemble of texts (Interpretation of Cultures 3- 30), canonizes the idea of culture as writing in the analytical imaginary. **The** cultural tum is associated by some critics with the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s**,** whose cultural activism they assume energized rebellion against "scientific" social and cultural inquiries and ushered in the cultural tum with its linguistic reading of culture and emphasis on the subjective (Bonnell and Hunt, ed., Beyond the Cultural Turn 1-32). Other critics have also related the cultural tum to the radical activism of the post-1968 era and to postmodemism as well as to a tendency among radical intellectuals,as Larry Ray and Andrew Sayer put it, to approach language no longer as reflecting "material being" but to read it(in Heidegger's words) as the "house of being"(Culture and Economy after the Cultural Turn I). These andsimilar explanations of the cultural tum are insightful in their own terms. However, **"**their own terms" are not only historically narrow but are conceived within the very terms that they seem to critique: they are, in other words, accounts of the cultural tum from within the cultural tum. As a result, in spite of their professed interest in material analysis, their interpretations, like the writings of the cultural tum, remain culturalist. Theytoo analyze culture in cultural terms-that is, immanently. Culture cannot be grasped in its own terms because its own terms are always the terms of ideology. Therefore to understand culture, one needs to look "outside."

#### Embracing “experience ignores the mediated nature of experience—it ignores the historical continuity of class domination in favor of a ‘local’ understanding of oppression

Young 6 Robert, Red Critique, Winter/Spring, “Putting Materialism back into Race Theory”, <http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2006/puttingmaterialismbackintoracetheory.htm>

Bourgeois philosophical assumptions haunt the Afrocentric project and, in the domain of black feminist theory, Patricia Hill Collins provides an instructive example of this intersection. In *Black Feminist Thought*, Collins posits the "special angle of vision" that black women bring to knowledge production process (21), and this "unique angle" (22) provides the "standpoint" for Afrocentric feminism, a feminism that she equates with humanism (37). Similar to the experiential metaphysics of Black women's standpoint theory, Collins also situates Afrocentric feminist epistemology "in the everyday experiences of African-American women" (207). Consequently, Collins suggests that "concrete experience" constitutes a criterion of meaning (208).However, the experiential, the "real", does not adequate the "truth", as Collins implies. Collins rejects the "Eurocentric Masculinist Knowlege Validation Process" for its positivism but, in turn, she offers empiricism as the grounds for validating experience. Hence, the validity of experiential claims is adjudicated by reference to the experience. Not only is her argument circular, but it also undermines one of her key claims. If race, class, gender, and the accompanying ideological apparatuses are interlocking systems of oppression, as Collins suggest, then the experiential is not the site for the "true" but rather the site for the articulation of dominant ideology. On what basis then, could the experiential provide grounds for an historical understanding of the structures that make experience itself possible as experience?Asante and Collins assume that experience is self-intelligible and in their discourse it functions as the limit text of the real. However, I believe experience is a highly mediated frame of understanding. Though it is true that a person of color experiences oppression, this experience is not self-explanatory and, therefore, it needs to be situated in relation to other social practices. Experience seems local but it is, like all cultural and political practices, interrelated to other practices and experiences. Thus its explanation come from its "outside". Theory, specifically Marxist theory, provides an explanation of this outside by reading the meaning of all experiences as determined by the economic realities of class. While Asante's and Collins' humanism reads the experience of race as a site of "self-presence", the history of race in the United States—from slavery to Jim Crow to Katrina—is written in the fundamental difference of class. In other words, experience does not speak the real, but rather it is the site of contradictions and, hence, in need of conceptual elaboration to break from cultural common sense, a conduit for dominant ideology. It is this outside that has come under attack by black (humanist) scholars through the invocation of the black (transcendental) subject.

#### Their politics require rejection of universal knowledge which perpetuates capitalism and anti-politics—historical and material analysis is the only subversive and revolutionary act.

**Smith**, a lecturer in social sciences at the University of Ballarat, 10-29-**10**

[Jeremy, “The rise and malaise of postmodernism” http://links.org.au/node/32 , accessed date: 4-29-12 y2k]

The political corollary of postulating all identities as unstable and fragmented is dissipation of opposition to capitalism as a whole: In a fragmented world composed of "decentred subjects", where totalizing knowledges are impossible and undesirable, What better escape, in theory, from a confrontation with capitalism, the most totalizing system the world has ever known, than a rejection of totalizing knowledge What greater obstacle, in practice, to anything more than the most local and particularistic resistances to the global, totalizing power of capitalism than the decentred and fragmented subject What better excuse for submitting to the force majeure of capitalism than the conviction that its power, while pervasive, has no systemic origin, no unified logic, no identifiable social roots24 In this passage, Ellen Meiksins-Wood draws attention to the political implications of postmodernism. If her description of postmodernism holds, then it is possible to go one step further: postmodernism can be characterised as an anti-politics. It is not anti-politics because it does not offer strategy, for it does after a fashion. It is antipolitical because it does not tell us much about what to confront capitalism with. What social, ethical and economic substance can we adopt to develop a vision of another possible world Is such a vision possible without a basis for universalism The most forceful versions of postmodernism can only shrug their collective shoulders ironically, so to speak, when confronted with these questions. We can't really even know the system, much less try to critically articulate credible alternatives to it. To try to change it involves an orientation to state power, and that is fraught with danger. For this reason, the intractable versions of postmodernism avoid politics and offer only an anti-politics dressed up as a localist strategy and not a revolutionary orientation at all. How postmodernists have, in hindsight, treated the movements of 1968 and the possibility of revolution can itself be seen as a test of this anti-politics: What the ideologues supply after the fact is a legitimation of the limits (of the ultimate limitations; in the last analysis of the historic weaknesses) of the May movement: you did not try to seize power and you were right, you did not even try to establish a counter-power. and you were once again right, because to say counter-power. is to say power and so on. At the same time, what the ideologues furnish us with is a retrospective legitimation of withdrawal, renunciation, non-commitment or of a punctilious and measured commitment: in any case, we are told that history, the subject, autonomy are only western myths.25 A "politics" of identity without substance and with strategy that addresses only the local and particular corresponds with this withdrawal after 1968.

#### Resisting capitalism is the ultimate ethical responsibility

Zizek and Daly 4 Slavoj and Glyn, Conversations with Zizek page 14-16

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

#### The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of historical materialism – this links social praxis to a decisive judgment on capitalism

Lukacs 67 George, Hungarian Marxist philosopher and literary critic. He is a founder of the tradition of Western Marxism. He contributed the ideas of reification and class consciousness to Marxist philosophy and theory, and his literary criticism was influential in thinking about realism and about the novel as a literary genre. He served briefly as Hungary's Minister of Culture as part of the government of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, History and Class Consciousness) <224-225>

Historical materialism has, therefore, a much greater value for the proletariat than that of a method of historical research. **It is one of** the most important of all its weapons. For the class struggleof the proletariat signifiesat the same time the awakening ofits class consciousness. And this awakening followed everywhere from an understanding of the true situation, of the actually existing historical connections. And it is this that gives the class struggleof the proletariat its special placeamong other class struggles, namely that it obtains its sharpest weapon from the hand of true science, from its clear insight into reality. Whereas in the class struggles of the past the most varied ideologies, religious, moral and other forms of 'false consciousness' were decisive, in the case of the class struggle of the proletariat, the war for the liberation of the last oppressed class**,** the revelation of the unvarnished truth became both a war-cry and the most potent weapon. By laying bare the springs of the historical process historical materialism became, in consequence of the class situation of the proletariat, an instrument of war. The most important function of historical materialism is to deliver a precise judgement on the capitalist social system, to unmask capitalist society. Throughout the class struggle of the proletariat, therefore, historical materialismhas constantly been used at every point, where, by means of all sorts of ideological frills, the bourgeoisie had concealed the true situation, the state of the class struggle; it has been used to focus the cold rays of science upon these veils and to show how false and misleading they were and how far they were in conflict with the truth**.** For this reason the chief function of historical materialism did not lie in the elucidation of pure scientific knowledge, but in the field of action. Historical materialism did not exist for its own sake, it existed so that the proletariat could understand a situation and so that, armed with this knowledge, it could act accordingly**.**

## Case

#### The university is a terrible space- coopts the movement

Occupied UC Berkeley 2009 (The Necrosocial: Civic Life, Social Death, and the UC. November 18. Published online November 19, 2009 on Anti-Capital Projects. http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/the-necrosocial/, DOA: October 27, 2013, np)

Being president of the University of California is like being manager of a cemetery: there are many people under you, but no one is listening. UC President Mark Yudof Capital is dead labor which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labor. Karl Marx Politics is death that lives a human life. Achille Mbembe Yes, very much a cemetery. Only here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like the university just like the state just like the economy manages our social death, translating what we once knew from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, into acceptable forms of social conflict. Who knew that behind so much civic life (electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam) was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss? And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. When students begin to hold libraries over night, beginning to take our first baby step as an autonomous movement he reins us in by serendipitously announcing library money. He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us. He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where ideas are wisps of ether—that is, meaning is ripped from action. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: to perpetually deliberate, the endless fleshing-out-of—when we push the boundaries of this form they are quick to reconfigure themselves to contain us: the chancellor’s congratulations, the reopening of the libraries, the managed general assembly—there is no fight against the administration here, only its own extension. Each day passes in this way, the administration on the look out to shape student discourse—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. It becomes banal, thoughtless. So much so that we see we are accumulating days: one semester, two, how close to being this or that, how far? This accumulation is our shared history. This accumulation—every once in a while interrupted, violated by a riot, a wild protest, unforgettable fucking, the overwhelming joy of love, life shattering heartbreak—is a muted, but desirous life. A dead but restless and desirous life. The university steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also steals and homogenizes meaning. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. Social death is, of course, simply the power source, the generator, of civic life with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death: its garrulous slogans of freedom and democracy designed to obscure the shit and decay in which our feet are planted. Yes, the university is a graveyard, but it is also a factory: a factory of meaning which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death. A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; which everywhere reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property). Everywhere the same whimsical ideas of the future. Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, discourse designed to make our very moments here together into a set of legible and fruitless demands.

#### No one listens to your aff- no spillover

Occupied UC Berkeley 2009 (The Necrosocial: Civic Life, Social Death, and the UC. November 18. Published online November 19, 2009 on Anti-Capital Projects. http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/the-necrosocial/, DOA: October 27, 2013, np)

Totally managed death. A machine for administering death, for the proliferation of technologies of death. As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, it matters little what face one puts on the university—whether Yudof or some other lackey. These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—each one the product of some exploitation—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’ But the ‘irrelevant’ departments also have their place. With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the blind inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, co-opting and containing radical potential. And so we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring the most obvious fact that we ourselves are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only words which matter, words about words which matter. The university gladly permits the precautionary lectures on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism. And all the while power weaves the invisible nets which contain and neutralize all thought and action, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls. There is no need to speak truth to power when power already speaks the truth. The university is a graveyard– así es. The graveyard of liberal good intentions, of meritocracy, opportunity, equality, democracy. Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to the university’s ghosts, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs, given their book titles, their citations. This is our gothic—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless. In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us. Here we are at odds with one another socially, each of us: students, faculty, staff, homebums, activists, police, chancellors, administrators, bureaucrats, investors, politicians, faculty/ staff/ homebums/ activists/ police/ chancellors/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ investors/ politicians-to-be. That is, we are students, or students of color, or queer students of color, or faculty, or Philosophy Faculty, or Gender and Women Studies faculty, or we are custodians, or we are shift leaders—each with our own office, place, time, and given meaning. We form teams, clubs, fraternities, majors, departments, schools, unions, ideologies, identities, and subcultures—and thankfully each group gets its own designated burial plot. Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard?

#### No endless war

Gray 7 Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute, Colin, "The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration", SSI, July, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf-http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war.51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical inse- curity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not at all convincing. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, must be nothing if not pragmatic.

#### Representation doesn’t shape reality—it’s the other way around.

Fram-Cohen 85—Michelle Fram-Cohen is a freelance translator and interpreter between Hebrew and English that has published articles on literature, translation theory, and philosophy, “Reality, Language, Translation: What Makes Translation Possible,” 1985, Paper presented at the American Translators Association Conference, http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/michellefr-amcohen//possibilityoftranslation.html)

The idea that language is created inside one's mind independently of outside experience eliminates the possibility that the external world is the common source of all languages. But a common source of all languages underlies any attempt to explain the possibility of translation. Chomsky suggests that the common basis of all languages is universal phonetics and semantics, with the result that "certain objects of human thoughts and mentality are essentially invariable across languages." (13) To the best of my knowledge Chomsky did not develop this idea in the direction of explaining the possibility of translation. In contrast, linguist Eugene Nida insists that outside experience is the common basis of all languages when he writes that "each language is different from all other languages in the ways in which the sets of verbal symbol classify the various elements of experience." (14) Nida did not provide the philosophical basis of the view that the external world is the common source of all languages. Such a basis can be found in the philosophy of Objectivism, originated by Ayn Rand. Objectivism, as its name implies, upholds the objectivity of reality. This means that reality is independent of consciousness, consciousness being the means of perceiving reality, not of creating it. Rand defines language as "a code of visual-auditory symbols that denote concepts." (15) These symbols are the written or spoken words of any language. Concepts are defined as the "mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted." (16) This means that concepts are abstractions of units perceived in reality. Since words denote concepts, words are the symbols of such abstractions; words are the means of representing concepts in a language. Since reality provides the data from which we abstract and form concepts, reality is the source of all words--and of all languages. The very existence of translation demonstrates this fact. If there was no objective reality, there could be no similar concepts expressed in different verbal symbols. There could be no similarity between the content of different languages, and so, no translation. Translation is the transfer of conceptual knowledge from one language into another. It is the transfer of one set of symbols denoting concepts into another set of symbols denoting the same concepts. This process is possible because concepts have specific referents in reality. Even if a certain word and the concept it designates exist in one language but not in another, the referent this word and concept stand for nevertheless exists in reality, and can be referred to in translation by a descriptive phrase or neologism. Language is a means describing reality, and as such can and should expand to include newly discovered or innovated objects in reality. The revival of the ancient Hebrew language in the late 19th Century demonstrated the dependence of language on outward reality. Those who wanted to use Hebrew had to innovate an enormous number of words in order to describe the new objects that did not confront the ancient Hebrew speakers. On the other hand, those objects that existed 2000 years ago could be referred to by the same words. Ancient Hebrew could not by itself provide a sufficient image of modern reality for modern users.

#### Representations don’t influence reality

Kocher 00 Robert L., Author of “The American Mind in Denial” and Philosopher, “Discourse on Reality and Sanity”, http://freedom.orlingrabbe.com/lfetimes/reality\_sanity1.htm

While it is not possible to establish many proofs in the verbal world, and it is simultaneously possible to make many uninhibited assertions or word equations in the verbal world, it should be considered that reality is more rigid and does not abide by the artificial flexibility and latitude of the verbal world. The world of words and the world of human experience are very imperfectly correlated. That is, saying something doesn't make it true. A verbal statement in the world of words doesn't mean it will occur as such in the world of consistent human experience I call reality. In the event verbal statements or assertions disagree with consistent human experience, what proof is there that the concoctions created in the world of words should take precedence or be assumed a greater truth than the world of human physical experience that I define as reality? In the event following a verbal assertion in the verbal world produces pain or catastrophe in the world of human physical reality or experience, which of the two can and should be changed? Is it wiser to live with the pain and catastrophe, or to change the arbitrary collection of words whose direction produced that pain and catastrophe? Which do you want to live with? What proven reason is there to assume that when doubtfulness that can be constructed in verbal equations conflicts with human physical experience, human physical experience should be considered doubtful? It becomes a matter of choice and pride in intellectual argument. My personal advice is that when verbal contortions lead to chronic confusion and difficulty, better you should stop the verbal contortions rather than continuing to expect the difficulty to change. Again, it's a matter of choice. Does the outcome of the philosophical question of whether reality or proof exists decide whether we should plant crops or wear clothes in cold weather to protect us from freezing? Har! Are you crazy? How many committed deconstructionist philosophers walk about naked in subzero temperatures or don't eat? Try creating and living in an alternative subjective reality where food is not needed and where you can sit naked on icebergs, and find out what happens. I emphatically encourage people to try it with the stipulation that they don't do it around me, that they don't force me to do it with them, or that they don't come to me complaining about the consequences and demanding to conscript me into paying for the cost of treating frostbite or other consequences. (sounds like there is a parallel to irresponsibility and socialism somewhere in here, doesn't it?). I encourage people to live subjective reality. I also ask them to go off far away from me to try it, where I won't be bothered by them or the consequences. For those who haven't guessed, this encouragement is a clever attempt to bait them into going off to some distant place where they will kill themselves off through the process of social Darwinism — because, let's face it, a society of deconstructionists and counterculturalists filled with people debating what, if any, reality exists would have the productive functionality of a field of diseased rutabagas and would never survive the first frost. The attempt to convince people to create and move to such a society never works, however, because they are not as committed or sincere as they claim to be. Consequently, they stay here to work for left wing causes and promote left wing political candidates where there are people who live productive reality who can be fed upon while they continue their arguments. They ain't going to practice what they profess, and they are smart enough not to leave the availability of people to victimize and steal from while they profess what they pretend to believe in.

#### Policy shapes discourse

Mearsheimer 95 John J., Professor of Political Science – University of Chicago, “The False Promise of International Institutions, International Security, 19(3), Winter

Critical theory maintains that state behavior changes when discourse changes. But that argument leaves open the obvious and crucially important question: what determines why some discourses become dominant and others lose out in the marketplace of ideas? What is the mechanism that governs the rise and fall of discourses? This general question, in turn, leads to three more specific questions: 1) Why has realism been the hegemonic discourse in world politics for so long? 2) Why is the time ripe for its unseating? 3) Why is realism likely to be replaced by a more peaceful communitarian discourse? Critical theory provides few insights on why discourses rise and fall. Thomas Risse-Kappen writes, "Research on ... 'epistemic communities' of knowledge-based transnational networks has failed so far to specify the conditions under which specific ideas are selected and influence policies while others fall by the wayside." (156) Not surprisingly, critical theorists say little about why realism has been the dominant discourse, and why its foundations are now so shaky. They certainly do not offer a well-defined argument that deals with this important issue. Therefore, it is difficult to judge the fate of realism through the lens of critical theory. Nevertheless, critical theorists occasionally point to particular factors that might lead to changes in international relations discourse. In such cases, however, they usually end up arguing that changes in the material world drive changes in discourse**.** For example, when Ashley makes surmises about the future of realism, he claims that "a crucial issue is whether or not changing historical conditions have disabled longstanding realist rituals of power." Specifically, he asks whether "developments in late capitalist society," like the "fiscal crisis of the state," and the "internationalization of capital," coupled with "the presence of vastly destructive and highly automated nuclear arsenals [has] deprived statesmen of the latitude for competent performance of realist rituals of power?" (157) Similarly, Cox argues that fundamental change occurs when there is a "disjuncture" between "the stock of ideas people have about the nature of the world and the practical problems that challenge them." He then writes, "So many of us think the erstwhile dominant mental construct of neorealism is inadequate to confront the challenges of global politics today." (158) It would be understandable if realists made such arguments, since they believe there is an objective reality that largely determines which discourse will be dominant. Critical theorists, however, emphasize that the world is socially constructed, and not shaped in fundamental ways by objective factors. Anarchy, after all, is what we make of it. Yet when critical theorists attempt to explain why realism may be losing its hegemonic position, they too point to objective factors as the ultimate cause of change. Discourse, so it appears, turns out not to be determinative, but mainly a reflection of developments in the objective world. In short, it seems that when critical theorists who study international politics offer glimpses of their thinking about the causes of change in the real world, they make arguments that directly contradict their own theory, but which appear to be compatible with the theory they are challenging. (159)

#### Reject their epistemology claims---our knowledge productions are objective and there are legitimate threats.

Semiei 9 Mohammad Semiei is Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran, Northern Campus, Amir Abad, Tehran, Iran, “Neo-orientalism? A critical appraisal of changing Western perspectives: Bernard Lewis, John Esposito and Gilles Kepel,” <http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/8495/1/Mohammad_SAMIEI_ADDED.pdf>, DOA: 8-30-13, y2k

Influenced by some postmodernist schools of thought, Said’s whole approach suffers from four fundamental problems. First, asit is noted by a number of criticslike Bruce Robbins(Robbins, 1992: 54), Bryan Turner(Turner, 1994), Richard King (King, 1999: 84) and Michael Richardson (Richardson, 1990), Said show ssome main concerns about the validity of knowledge. For instance, he says that every representation, because it is a presentation, is embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the presenter (Said, 2003: 272). He elaborates his point that Orientalism is not a misrepresentation of some Oriental essence – which he does not believe in. Rather its main weaknessisthat it operates as other representations, for a purpose, according to a tendency, in a specific historical, intellectual, and even economic context (Said, 2003: 273). This approach to knowledge, however, can only weaken Said’s argument against Orientalism. The fact that “all representation is misrepresentation of one sort or another” (Said, 2001b: 237) is, no doubt, the nature of human knowledge. No branch of knowledge can grasp the reality as it is. In Robbins’s words: “If everything is a representation, then representation is not a scandal. Or if all representation is a scandal, then no particular representation is particularly scandalous” (Robbins, 1992: 54). Nevertheless, what is expected from a constructive methodology is to produce a more expressive portrait of its subject by generating better theories, not simply refuting other theories as being different from reality. They will be so forever. However, we must not disregard the fact that we can learn from our mistakes and gradually approach a better representation of reality through piecemeal corrections. Said appreciates such a criticism of Orientalism, admitting that “I had nothing to say about what the Orient was really like... That’s a fair criticism” (Said, 2001b: 268). Perhaps he also points to this fact when he says: “Orientalismis a partisan book, not a theoreticalmachine” (Said, 2003: 340). Sometimes, Said humbly admits that his methodology merely destroys a corpus of knowledge, nullifying theories suggested for some real questions, but never substitutes a better set of theories. Perhapsthe most important task of all, he admits, would be to think about some alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or a non‐repressive and non‐ manipulative, perspective. But, influenced by Foucault, he adds that one would have to rethink the whole complex problem of knowledge and power. “These are all tasksleft embarrassingly incomplete in thisstudy” (Said, 2003: 24). Indeed, his epistemology will never be able to contradict itself by producing any sort of presentation of the world,so this embarrassment is not just for Orientalism, but has deeper roots in the deficiency of his philosophy. To highlightthisshortcoming of Said, David Kopf compares him with Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru in his The Discovery of India, written in the Ahmadnegar Front Prison camp, though agrees with many of Said’s complaintsregarding the destructive impacts ofthe West, takes a constructive position on India’s future and admits the necessity of implementation of some Western inventions.8 He, unlike Said, does not merely indulge in a destructive dialectic, buttriesto take a constructive position as well(Kopf, 1980).9 Second, as noted by many criticslike Kopf (Kopf, 1980), King (King, 1999: 86) and Sadik Jalal al‐‘Azm(al‐‘Azm, 1981), it is hardly fair to attempt to refute others not in terms of what they say but, as it is most frequent in Orientalism, of motives allegedly behind their theories. At times just being in a Western imperial camp has been interpreted by Said as generating a corrupt view of the oppressed Orient. He sometimes supports that a Western scholar cannot produce a neutral research: “For if it is true that no production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever ignore or disclaimits author’s involvement as a human subject in his own circumstances then it must also be true that for a European or American studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of his actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, as an individual second” (Said, 2003: 11). Such a person, Said believes, suffers an egoistic will of power that feeds his endeavour and corrupts his ambitions (Said, 2003: 116). In line with this presumption in the context of the nineteenth century he adds: “It is therefore correct that every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric” (Said, 2003: 204). Considering his argument one can logically say that apparently Said himself firmly believes in an inevitable ontological dualism between the West and Islam since he affirms that the actuality of a Westerner is dramatically different from his subject of study in a way that he is a Westerner first and a human being second! Al‐‘Azm calls this way of thinking “Orientalism in reverse” which is a natural outcome of essentialising the occident in the same fashion that was done to the orient by Orientalism(al‐‘Azm, 1981). Third, as noted bymany criticslike Richardson (Richardson, 1990), King (King, 1999: 94) and Robbins (Robbins, 1992: 50), such a perspective is counterproductive. That is to say, one can object that whatever analyses Said has produced has no scientific value but wasmerely nurtured by a sense of vengeance upon the West which,to Said’s eyes, has been responsible for the occupation of his homeland, Palestine, and for making him ‘out of place’. Sometimes Said admits to being influenced by such a ‘political’ motive in the course of writing Orientalism: “I don’t think I would have written the book had I not been politically associated with a struggle. The struggle of Arab and Palestinian nationalism is very important to that book. Orientalism is not meant to be an abstract account of some historical formation but rather a part of the liberation from such stereotypes and such domination of my own people, whether they are Arabs, or Muslims, or Palestinians” (Said, 2001b: 374). One can say that, just based on that motivation and without any scientific and academic foundation, Said lumps together writers, scholars, and journalists of very diverse character and origin, and thereby conveys, rather than asserts, that they are all the same homogeneous, centrally directed, conspiratorial whole. The lastshortcoming thatI wantto raise about Said’s perspective is his dismissal ofthe fact that Western countries need to study their political rivals, i.e., Islam, Muslims, Islamic countries and Islamism as an ideology. For Said, however, any link between schools of area studies and government departments of foreign affairs can be translated into a corruption of scholarship. He questions why so many Islamic specialists were and still are routinely consulted by, and actively work for, Western governments whose aspirations are economic exploitation, domination or outright aggression (Said, 2003: 345). Consequently Said’s methodology is utterly unable to forecast any real threat against the West. For instance he quotes a statement from US News and World Report, July 6 1987 which claimsthat the martyr complex integral to minority Shia Iran now appears among the youth of the Sunni majority. Then he criticises the approach of the report: “No one bothers to ask, for instance, how verifiable isthe statement that martyrdom isspreading among Sunni youth, allseveral hundred million of them, from Morocco to Uzbekistan, and, if it is, what sort of evidence it islikely to be in the first place” (Said, 1997: xix). Although Said is right that many Orientalists tend unjustly to promote fear of Islam, there are at times some real threats that must be considered. The warning of the journal was shown to be quite relevant when the suicide operations of Sunni extremists happened in the real world and reached its apex in September 11

#### Unmasking the violence of Middle East representations solves nothing – the public at large doesn’t care and would actually call for more violence based on their K

Colla 3 Elliott Colla, Director of Middle East Studies at the Watson Institute for International Studies and Professor of Comparative Literature at Brown, 2003, Postcolonial Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 116, EBSCO, DOA: 8-29-13, y2k

Both Chomsky and Ali adhere to models of moral criticism that explain the relationship between political constituencies and current geopolitical conﬂicts in terms of false consciousness: in Ali’s analysis, Muslims have been misled by political Islamism; likewise, in both Chomsky and Ali, Unitedstatesian citizens have been duped by US empire. This logic of false consciousness urgently needs to be questioned at this moment, especially in analyses of the relationship between US foreign policy and the US public sphere. While such an argument does seem to adequately explain the gaps between what US governments say and the naked interests—from oil to arms sales to military hegemony—they have pursued, it tends to suggest that by and large US citizens are disconnected from, and unrepresented by, the politics pursued by their governments, and that (Chomsky is most explicit on this) if they knew what was done in their names, they would act to correct such policies. Posed this way, the task of analysis is to compose a register of facts that run counter to the ofﬁcial narratives of the US government. This counter-archive of truth, it is assumed, would be enough to move US citizens to act, and to act in a way that would be morally superior to their government. The gamble implied by this strategy of moral critique is that knowledge of truth leads to moral actions. Sadly, if only this were true! As Chomsky’s long career illustrates, the mere publication of the facts of US empire may not necessarily be sufﬁcient to move the Unitedstatesian reading public to act as a moral agent. Thus, even as critiques such as Chomsky’s do accurately outline the shape of macro-economic interests and geopolitical manoeuvres writ large, they fail to explain the possibility that the US public might be comfortable with such forms of politics despite the fact that they appear to run counter to their own economic interests and their avowed moral values. Chomsky would like to close the gap between the values of such a public and the actions of the government that claims to represent that public. However, the disconnection may not merely be because the facts of its government’s actions are repressed (which they no doubt often are), but also because they are explicitly known, well-understood, and endowed with cultural values in which the US public is actively invested. In short, it is possible that the US public could be confronted with a comprehensive list of the violent consequences of its foreign policy, and yet remain unmoved to correct that policy, or worse, move to extend its violence even further. The current popularity of President Bush’s hawkish policies toward the Middle East suggests that this is not only possible, but also probable. This, then, is the limit inherent in the moral critique of US empire proposed by Chomsky: inasmuch as it speaks directly to the putatively rational motives of interest, it remains mute about the imaginary investments that are thoroughly imbricated in such interests.

#### They increases drone usage

Goldsmith 12 Proxy Detention in Somalia, and the Detention-Drone Tradeoff, Jack Goldsmith, Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, served as Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel from 2003–2004, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense from 2002–2003, member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, June 29, 2012, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/06/proxy-detention-in-somalia-and-the-detention-drone-tradeoff/

There has been speculation about the effect of the Obama administration’s pinched detention policy – i.e. no new detainees brought to GTMO, and no new detainees to Parwan (Afghanistan) from outside Afghanistan – on its other counterterrorism policies. I have long believed there must be some tradeoff between narrowing U.S. detention capabilities and other counterterrorism options, at least implicitly, and not necessarily for the better. As I wrote three years ago, in response to news reports that the Obama administration’s cutback on USG detentions resulted in more USG drone strikes and more outsourcing of rendition, detention, and interrogation:¶ There are at least two problems with this general approach to incapacitating terrorists. First, it is not ideal for security. Sometimes it would be more useful for the United States to capture and interrogate a terrorist (if possible) than to kill him with a Predator drone. Often the United States could get better information if it, rather than another country, detained and interrogated a terrorist suspect. Detentions at Guantanamo are more secure than detentions in Bagram or in third countries.The second problem is that terrorist suspects often end up in less favorable places. Detainees in Bagram have fewer rights than prisoners at Guantanamo, and many in Middle East and South Asian prisons have fewer yet. Likewise, most detainees would rather be in one of these detention facilities than be killed by a Predator drone. We congratulate ourselves when we raise legal standards for detainees, but in many respects all we are really doing is driving the terrorist incapacitation problem out of sight, to a place where terrorist suspects are treated worse.

#### No torture now

Taylor and Wittes 9 [Stuart Taylor, Senior Fellows at the Brookings Institute and Contributing Editor for Newsweek, and Benjamin Wittes, Senior Fellow and Research Director in Public Law at the Brookings Institute; “Looking Forward, Not Backward: Refining American Interrogation Law,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/5/10%20interrogation%20law%20wittes/0510\_interrogation\_law\_wittes.pdf]cd

Finally, in September 2006, after detailed internal debates, the Pentagon adopted major revisions to the Army Field Manual, wh ich had acquired the force of law as a consequence of the McCain Amendment. 64 The new rules allow some new non-coercive methods, including forms of trickery, but ban a list of eight speci fied harsh methods. 65 More remarkably, and in contrast to the 1992 edition of the Army Field Manual—which listed as a Geneva-compliant method “Fear Up (Harsh),” defined as exploiting a prisoner’s fears by behaving in an overpow ering manner with a loud and threatening voice—the September 2006 edition bans all coercion and threats. 66 The revised rules include enough detail to provide clear notice to military interrogators of what they can and cannot do. They comply with the Geneva Conventions. And since they were adopted, there have been few complaints about military interrogations. The McCain Amendment had also given the CIA new legal guidance—albeit much vaguer guidance than it gave the military. It granted the agency more latitude to use coercive methods than it gave the militar y, imposing a high-altitude ban on “cruel, inhuman, or degrading” treatment of prisoners . Critically, it defined those terms with reference to federal case law that allows th e use of coercive interrogation methods if the need for information is su fficiently dire and urgent. 67 But the Hamdan decision subjected the CIA, as well as military interrogations, to the strict requirements of Comm on Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of the War Crimes Act. This prompted the CIA temporarily to suspend its “enhanced interrogation program” after the decision. Then, in October 2006, the administration and Congress blunted the impact of the Hamdan decision on CIA interrogators by rushing through a new interrogation law, enacted as part of the Military Commissions Act (MCA). While the MCA’s chief purpose was to reconstitute the military commissions the Court had struck down, Section 6 of the new law e ffectively immunized administration officials from any prosecutions under the War Crimes Act for most pre-MCA conduct violating Common Article 3 unless they had inflicted such severe pain as to violate the anti-torture law, too. 68 (Previously, the Detainee Treatment Ac t had immunized officials who relied reasonably and in good faith on Justice Department advice that specified interrogation methods were legal. 69 ) Looking to future interrogations, the MCA also specified that only “grave breaches” of Common Article 3 could be prosecuted under the War Crimes Act, and it defined “grave breaches” narrowly enough to exclude much conduct that could be considered “humiliating or degrad ing.” Only murder, maiming, sexual abuse, biological experiments, taking hostages, violations of the narrowly-drafted torture statute, and “cruel or inhuman treatment” would qualify as prosecutable “grave breaches.” The MCA delegated to the president the authority to define the parameters of Common Article 3 short of the grave breaches the statute itself outlined. This President Bush did in an executive order in July 2007, which inte rpreted Common Article 3 and the MCA in ways that allow room for some highly coercive interrogation methods so long as the purpose is to gain intelligence rather than to humiliate or degrade the prisoner. 70 Justice Department officials opined that interrogation methods “undertaken to prevent a threatened terrorist attack” might be permitted even if the same methods would be illegal if done “for the purpose of humiliation or abuse.” 71 This logic was attacked by some experts as at best strained when it became public in 2008. Still, any use of waterboarding (to pick one example) after the effective da te of the MCA might violate the War Crimes Act, as “cruel or inhuman treatment,” if the resulting “men tal harm” is “serious and non- transitory;” it need not be “prolonged” e nough to fall within the de finition of “torture.” 72 Indeed, while the Justice Department conti nued to maintain that the CIA’s use of waterboarding with “strict limitations and sa feguards” did not viol ate the anti-torture statute, it conceded that Hamdan and the MCA “would make it much more difficult to conclude that the practice was la wful” than it had been before. 73 Whatever the precise limits placed on future interrogations by the MCA, it’s clear that the McCain Amendment and the September 2006 re vision of the Army Field Manual mean that if and when any president again wants suspected terrorists squeezed hard for information, the CIA will have to do the dirty work. And unless one wishes to see coercive interr ogation banned entirely, th is division of labor makes a great deal of sense. It was a mist ake, as many military lawyers argued at the time, for the Bush Administration to allow military interrogators to use highly coercive methods. The military has held tens of thousa nds of prisoners in occupied Iraq and in Afghanistan. Most are small-fry with little or no useful information. Most also qualify— as a matter of U.S. policy, if not strict lega l right—for the kid-glove treatment required by the Fourth Geneva Convention for citizens of occupied countries. In addition, military interrogations are ofte n conducted by thousands of low -ranking personnel with much less professional training and supervision than CIA interrogators, as illustrated by the catastrophic breakdown of disc ipline at Abu Ghraib. These are among the reasons the military has traditionally imposed strict re straints on its interrogators and why the Pentagon made these restraints more exacting than ever before in the September 2006 revision of the Army Field Manual. The CIA, on the other hand, has since Septem ber 11 assembled a small cadre of highly trained professional interrogators operating far from combat zones and under close supervision and only in cases involving people they believ e to be the highest-value detainees. These attributes provide some insurance against the grave danger that individual interrogators will get carried aw ay in their efforts to break a prisoner’s resistance and violate the law or the policy limits by which they should be bound The Obama Reforms to Date Banning coercive interrogation entirely is exactly what the Obama Administration has sought to do so far. The new president’s executive order concer ning CIA interrogation and detention authorities came within 48 hours of his in augural oath, and it made quite clear that, at least for the immediate te rm, Obama—unlike his predecessor—was not going to hide rough interrogations behind wo rds like “humane.” The order took strong policy stands on all of the key ques tions—and it marked a significant shift. For starters, the order revoked a great deal of the legal gui dance the Bush Administration had given the CIA on the subject of interr ogation and replaced th at guidance with a requirement that CIA interroga tions comply with the Army Field Manual. This step, long sought by human rights groups a nd other critics of the Bu sh Administration’s harsh interrogation policies, effectively accomplished w ith a stroke of the presidential pen what Congress sought to do the previous year ye t been stymied by President Bush’s veto.